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What is stored in long-term memory from current sensations is a question that has
attracted considerable interest. Over time, several prominent theories have consistently
proposed that only attended sensory information leaves a durable memory trace
whereas unattended information is not stored beyond the current moment, an
assumption that seems to be supported by abundant empirical evidence. Here we
show, by using a more sensitive memory test than in previous studies, that this is actually
not true. Observers viewed a rapid stream of real-world object pictures overlapped by
words (presentation duration per stimulus: 500 ms, interstimulus interval: 200 ms), with
the instruction to attend to the words and detect word repetitions, without knowing
that their memory would be tested later. In a surprise two-alternative forced-choice
recognition test, memory for the unattended object pictures was tested. Memory
performance was substantially above chance, even when detailed feature knowledge
was necessary for correct recognition, even when tested 24 h later, and even although
participants reported that they do not have any memories. These findings suggests
that humans have the ability to store at high speed detailed copies of current visual
stimulations in long-term memory independently of current intentions and the current
attentional focus.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are walking along a street together with a friend, focusing your attention
completely on your conversation. While walking and talking, your eyes wander around, randomly
fixating for less than a second on visual objects passing by, without you noticing the information
that reaches your eyes at all. Twenty-four hours later, someone asks you unexpectedly about your
memories for the objects your eyes had briefly fixated on during that walk. How many objects
would you remember? And if you remembered any object at all, how detailed would the memory
be? The aim of the present study was to examine these questions.
The question of what is stored in long-term memory from current sensations has intrigued
humans for centuries (e.g., Burnham, 1888; Loftus and Loftus, 1980). In view of the apparent
problem that an overwhelming amount of information would have to be stored and handled if
all of the information reaching our senses at any moment persisted in memory, common wisdom
over time has been that only a small part of the information leaves a durable memory trace whereas
the rest is quickly lost, an assumption that is reflected in prominent theories which have been
developed over time (e.g., Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; Wolfe, 1999; Cowan, 2001; Lavie, 2010).
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More specifically, the common assumption is that primary
sensations from the environment are only temporarily stored
in large-capacity sensory-memory systems. As processing at
later stages is strongly limited in capacity, only a small part
of the information stored in sensory memory can be read out
for further processing and final storage in long-term memory.
The mechanism underlying selection for further processing is
assumed to be attention. Only information to which attention is
directed is further processed whereas unattended information is
no longer available after short amounts of time, an assumption
that lies also at the heart of classic early-selection theories
(Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1969).
In fact, such a view seems to be supported by abundant
empirical evidence. The existence of sensory memory and the
seemingly rapid decay of unattended sensory information were
first demonstrated by Sperling (1960). He showed that when
observers were asked to report as many stimuli as possibly from
a briefly presented stimulus array, they were able to report only
about four stimuli, a limit which is believed to reflect the limited
capacity of visual working memory (e.g., Luck and Vogel, 1997;
Cowan, 2001). Intriguingly, if a cue was presented after the offset
of the array that directed attention to four stimuli of the array that
should be reported, observers were able to report the cued stimuli
almost perfectly. As the to-be-reported stimuli were not known
until the cue was presented, this finding implies that at the time
of the cue many more stimuli are available than are subsequently
stored in visual working memory. However, with increased delay
of the cue, performance quickly decreased, and the cue was
no longer helpful after less than a second, which suggests that
unattended sensory information decays within less than a second
(for a review for the numerous replications, see Cowan, 2008).
In more recent research, the very rapid decay of sensory memory
has been questioned by studies where memory was measured by
the ability to detect a change in the presented stimulus array (i.e.,
change detection paradigm) rather than by the ability to recollect
stimuli from memory, showing that cues can be helpful for up to
4 s (the so-called retro-cue effect; e.g., Lepsien et al., 2005; Sligte
et al., 2008). However, beyond demonstrating that the life-time of
sensory memory may be slightly longer, these studies still suggest
that information stored in sensory memory is fragile and only
protected from decay when attention is directed to it (e.g., Sligte
et al., 2008).
The assumption that unattended information is not stored
beyond the current moment seems to also be supported by
numerous recent studies in the domain of long-term memory.
In these studies, to rule out the methodological problem that
the processing of the task-relevant stimuli may leave some
unused capacity that then may unintentionally spill over to
task-irrelevant stimuli, high attentional load tasks were used.
Observers saw a rapid stream of pictures overlapped by words,
and were instructed to attend to either the pictures or the words
and detect stimulus repetitions in the attended domain. In all of
the existing studies using such high attentional load tasks, it was
consistently found that observes showed a null memory effect
for the unattended stimuli in a subsequent recognition test (Rees
et al., 1999; Ruz et al., 2005a,b; Butler and Klein, 2009; Lavie et al.,
2009; Hoffman et al., 2011). Thus, taken together, it appears to
be common wisdom that only attended information is stored
in long-term memory whereas unattended information decays
rapidly and is no longer reportable after short periods of time.
However, using the above high attentional load paradigm, over
time, a few findings have been reported that make it appear
possible that this common wisdom may actually not be true.
First, while replicating the finding that no explicit awareness of
unattended information is apparent in recognition tests, Butler
and Klein (2009) reported increased perceptual priming effects
for unattended stimuli in an implicit perceptual memory test,
indicating that unattended information may be retained at least
in the form of perceptual representations. Indeed, this finding
is reminiscent of findings in the domain of repetition priming,
demonstrating that a brief exposure to a visual image without
mentioning that memory will be tested later leads to a processing
benefit when the image is encountered again after several days,
months, or even years (Mitchell and Brown, 1988; Mitchell,
2006). Second, while again replicating the finding that no explicit
awareness of unattended information is apparent in recognition
tests, Hoffman et al. (2011) reported that participants were less
confident in their “no” responses to unattended old stimuli
compared to the “no” responses to new stimuli. Such a finding
provides preliminary evidence that the null effects found in
previous studies may actually not reflect absent explicit memory
for unattended stimuli, but instead the fact that memory tests
have been used that were insufficiently sensitive to detect it.
The aim of the present study was to examine whether
actually much more from current sensations is stored in
long-term memory than currently believed by using a more
sensitive recognition test than in previous research. Following
the procedure used in previous studies, observers were shown
a rapid stream of pictures of real-world objects overlapped
by words, with the instruction to attend to the words and
to press a button every time a word was repeated (for an
illustration, see Figure 1). To preclude any strategic encoding
processes, it was not mentioned that memory for the objects
would be tested later. However, unlike in previous studies
where recognition was measured by single item old/new
recognition tests, we used a two-alternative forced choice
recognition test where a previously seen object was paired with
a foil object that had not been presented before, with the
instruction to select the previously seen object. As shown in
previous research, compared to old/new recognition tests that
heavily rely on recollective experience, such a memory test
more sensitively measures the actual amount of information
stored in memory (Holdstock et al., 2002; Cunningham et al.,
2015).
Beyond examining the pure existence of long-term memory
representations for unattended stimuli, we addressed three
further questions. First, to additionally measure the fidelity of
stored representations, we varied the similarity between the
previously presented objects and the foils in three steps (novel vs.
exemplar vs. state; for an illustration, see Figure 1; for details see
the method section), following previous research in the domain
of visual long-term memory (Brady et al., 2008). Second, to
additionally measure the durability of stored representations, half
of the objects were tested immediately after the perception task,
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FIGURE 1 | Memory Paradigm. Participants were shown a rapid stream of 128 different real-world object pictures overlapped by different words that were randomly
rotated from trial to trial clockwise or counterclockwise with the instruction to press a button every time a word was repeated (presentation time of stimuli: 500 ms,
interstimulus interval: 200 ms, two cycles). No mention was made that memory for the object pictures would be tested later. Memory for half of the object pictures
was tested in a surprise recognition test immediately afterward, the other half was tested in a second recognition test after 24 h. A two-alternative forced choice test
was used with foil objects varying in similarity (novel vs. exemplar vs. state).
and the other half were tested after 24 h. Third, to additionally
examine whether participants were aware of their memory
abilities, for each response in the memory test, participants
were asked to indicate whether a response was made based on
recollective experience or whether they guessed. In view of recent
findings that participants can show relatively substantial levels of
recognition memory in two-alternative forced choice recognition
tests despite believing that they are simply guessing (Voss et al.,
2008; Craik et al., 2015), it may be that the involved memory
system operates below awareness.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Forty-one undergraduate students (35 females; mean
age = 20.1 years, SD = 3.1) participated for course credit.
The sample size was based on a power analysis (G∗Power
3.1.718; Faul et al., 2007) to have sufficient power (0.80,
alpha = 0.05, one-tailed) in order to detect small-to-medium
sized effects (d = 0.4). All participants provided written
informed consent and reported normal or corrected-
to-normal vision acuity and normal color vision. Data
from one participant were excluded due to poor word-
repetition detection performance (below 75%). Including this
participant did not change any of the reported results. All data
exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study are
reported.
Materials, Design, and Procedure
The procedure of the study followed the paradigm introduced by
Rees et al. (1999) and involved an incidental encoding task, an
immediate recognition test that was conducted directly after the
encoding task, and a delayed recognition test that was conducted
after 24 h. In the incidental encoding task, a rapid stream of
128 sequentially presented stimuli was presented two times with
a short break of 1 min in between. All Stimuli were presented
on a white background at the center of a screen for 500 ms
with an interstimulus interval of 200 ms using E-Prime 2.0 (PST,
Pittsburgh, PA, United States). Each stimulus consisted of an
object picture (approximately 5◦ of visual angle) superimposed
with a five-letter German noun (uppercase letters and colored
in red) that was unrelated to the objects. The stream started
and ended with four filler stimuli that were not included in the
later memory tests to control for primacy and recency effects.
In between, 120 target object pictures were presented in random
order. The 120 object pictures were taken from the study by Brady
et al. (2008). To manipulate word repetitions, two pseudorandom
word orderings were generated where word repetitions occurred
on average once every five items (24 repetitions per presentation
sequence). The words were randomly rotated from trial to trial by
45◦ clockwise or counterclockwise, and they were always shown
in different orientations on repetition trials. Participants were
instructed to attend to the words, and to press a button every time
a word was repeated. To acquaint participants with the task, they
initially practiced the repetition detection of words on a stream of
20 stimuli that were not used in the later experiment.
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In both the immediate and the delayed recognition memory
tests, two objects were presented on the screen, one previously
seen old object picture, and one new foil object picture. To
vary the similarity between previously presented objects and
foils, from the 120 previously presented object pictures, 40 were
paired with pictures from an object of a different category
(novel), 40 were paired with a picture from a physically similar
object from the same basic-level category (exemplar), and the
remaining 40 were paired with a picture from the same object
that differed in the shown state or pose (for details see Brady
et al., 2008). Observers were instructed to indicate which of the
objects they had seen before in a two-alternative forced-choice
task. Participants were allowed to proceed at their own pace. They
were instructed to guess if they could not base their response
on recollective experience, and after each response, they were
asked to indicate whether they had guessed. In the immediate
recognition test, half of the 120 target object pictures (20 novel,
20 exemplar, 20 state) were tested. In the recognition test after
24 h, all 120 target object pictures were tested. The assignment of
object pictures to the immediate test was counterbalanced across
participants. In half of the trials, the foil object was shown on
the left, in the other half on the right; the order of trials was
randomized. After the immediate test, participants were asked
to report whether they had expected that their memory for the
objects would be tested later.
Statistical Analysis
As a correct response in a two-alternative forced choice test can
reflect not only a correct response but also a fortunate guess,
we corrected the observed percentage correct (PCObserved) for
each participant for the effects of random guessing, using the
formula PCAdjusted = 2 ∗ PCObserved − 100. The adjusted memory
performance (PCAdjusted) estimates how often observers truly
remember an object, after accounting for fortunate guesses (see
Brady et al., 2013). To determine whether memory performance
was above chance, one-sample t-tests with one-tailed alpha level
were used for data analysis. In the recognition test after 24 h, data
were separately analyzed for objects that had not been tested in




Mean word repetition detection performance in the incidental
encoding task was high (M = 0.95, 95% CI [93.2, 96.0]),
indicating that all participants fully focused their attention on the
words. The post-experiment questionnaire confirmed that none
of the participants expected that their memory for the stimuli
would be tested later.
Recognition Memory
The results for the immediate and delayed recognition memory
tests are shown in Figure 2. The height of the bars shows
the percentage of objects that was correctly remembered, after
accounting for fortunate guesses. In the immediate test, observers
showed strong object memory, even when subtle details had
to be remembered (Novel: M = 47.5%, 95% CI [37.5, 57.5],
t(39)= 9.55, p< 0.001, d = 1.53; Exemplar: M = 24.8%, 95% CI
[18.9, 30.6], t(39) = 8.40, p < 0.001, d = 1.36; State: M = 20.0%,
95% CI [13.2, 26.8], t(39) = 5.81, p < 0.001, d = 0.94). In
the delayed recognition test, even when memory for the objects
was the first time tested after a delay of 24 h, still substantial
memory was found (Novel: M = 20.5%, 95% CI [12.4, 28.6],
t(39) = 5.00, p < 0.001, d = 0.81; Exemplar: M = 8.3%, 95% CI
[2.2, 14.3], t(39) = 2.59, p = 0.007, d = 0.44; State: M = 13.5%,
95% CI [7.1, 19.9], t(39) = 4.10, p < 0.001, d = 0.67). Memory
performance for objects that had already been tested in the
immediate recognition test was high as well (Novel: M = 36.8%,
95% CI [27.5, 46.1], t(39) = 8.03, p < 0.001, d = 1.27; Exemplar:
M= 22.0%, 95% CI [14.0, 30.0], t(39)= 5.54, p< 0.001, d= 0.88;
State: M = 10.3%, 95% CI [3.1, 17.4], t(39) = 2.91, p = 0.003,
d = 0.46).
Regarding participants’ awareness of their memory abilities,
for most of their responses, participants reported that they simply
had guessed (immediate test: M = 76.9% of trials, 95% CI [72.5,
81.3]; test after 24 h for objects that had not been tested in
the immediate test: M = 94.5% of trials, 95% CI [92.3, 96.8]).
Analyzing results only for guess trials revealed still substantial
object memory, both in the immediate test (Novel: M = 26.3%,
95% CI [13.1, 39.5], t(39) = 3.95, p < 0.001, d = 0.64; Exemplar:
M = 10.7%, 95% CI [3.5, 17.9], t(39)= 2.87, p= 0.003, d = 0.48;
State: M = 14.2%, 95% CI [7.7, 20.8], t(39) = 4.23, p < 0.001,
d = 0.69) and in the test after 24 h (Novel: M = 16.5%, 95% CI
[8.5, 24.6], t(39)= 4.02, p< 0.001, d= 0.66; Exemplar: M= 7.0%,
95% CI [1.0, 12.9], t(39) = 2.18, p = 0.018, d = 0.37; State:
M = 13.9%, 95% CI [7.2, 20.6], t(39)= 4.03, p< 0.001, d= 0.66).
DISCUSSION
Several prominent theories that have been developed over time
have proposed that only attended information leaves a durable
memory trace whereas unattended information is not stored
beyond the current moment (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Atkinson and
Shiffrin, 1968; Wolfe, 1999; Cowan, 2001; Lavie, 2010). Some of
the most convincing results seem to come from studies where
observers were shown a rapid stream of words superimposed
on real-world object pictures with the instruction to attend to
either the pictures or the words and detect stimulus repetitions
in the attended domain, without mentioning that memory would
be tested later. Because such a task poses high demands on
processing capacity and because participants did not expect a
subsequent memory test, an unintentional spill over of attention
to task-irrelevant stimuli is minimized. All existing studies have
consistently found that observes showed a null memory effect for
the unattended stimuli in a subsequent memory test (Rees et al.,
1999; Ruz et al., 2005a,b; Butler and Klein, 2009; Hoffman et al.,
2011).
However, in these previous studies, single item old/new
recognition tests have been used. By using instead a more
sensitive two-alternative forced choice recognition test, the
present findings challenge the view that unattended stimuli are
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FIGURE 2 | Recognition Memory Performance. The percentage of correctly remembered object pictures (corrected for guessing) is shown as a function of delay of
the test (immediate vs. 24 h) and type of foil object (novel vs. exemplar vs. state). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
not stored beyond the current moment. When a previously
presented picture was paired with a new picture from
an object of a different category (novel condition), almost
half of the presented unattended pictures were correctly
recognized (recognition rates corrected for guessing). Even
more intriguingly, even when detailed feature knowledge
was necessary for correct recognition (exemplar and state
conditions), recognition performance was substantially above
chance. And most intriguingly, even when participants’ memory
for the unattended pictures was tested the first time 24 h later,
recognition performance was still substantially above chance.
These findings demonstrate that humans unintentionally store at
high speed detailed copies of current visual stimulations in long-
term memory for at least 24 h independently of the current focus
of attention.
Interestingly, recognition performance was high even
although participants reported that they do not have any
memories and that they simply guessed. Such a finding supports
recent findings demonstrating the phenomenon of recognition
without awareness (Voss et al., 2008; Craik et al., 2015), and
may provide an explanation why the existence of long-term
memory representations for unattended stimuli has been
hitherto overlooked. Indeed, the present findings remind of the
phenomenon of “blindsight” in which cortically blind individuals
are able to identify visual stimuli when they are prompted to
guess (Kentridge et al., 1999). Interestingly, these persons do
not show any kind of confidence in their abilities even when
informed about it, suggesting that they are both unaware and
not convincible about their abilities. Thus, similar to blindsight
individuals, it may be almost impossible to discover by everyday
introspection that there is actually much more stored in visual
long-term memory than consciously experienced.
One interesting question concerns the nature of the visual
long-term memory representations that were formed for the
unattended pictures of real-world objects. Basically, from a
perceptual perspective, two qualitatively different processing
steps are involved when visual objects are initially represented in
the cognitive system, and both of their outputs may provide the
basis on which objects are stored. First, signals from the retina
are analyzed to extract visual features such as orientation, colors,
and so forth, a process by which highly detailed representations
of independent features are created that are closely linked
to the physical properties of the visual objects. Second, the
independent feature representations are integrated into coherent
object representations, leading to the phenomenal experience
of a visual scene that is segregated into coherent objects (e.g.,
Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999; Serences and Yantis, 2006). As it is
commonly assumed that attention is required for the binding of
features into coherent object representations (e.g., Treisman and
Gelade, 1980), it seems that the unattended real-world objects
in the present study were stored in the form of independent
features representations. Indeed, previous research has shown
that low-level feature information such as spatial frequency
information can be retained with high precision in long-term
memory (Magnussen and Dyrnes, 1994; Magnussen et al., 2003),
and that the quality of object representations in visual long-term
memory can be predicted from early preattentive brain activities
(Spachtholz and Kuhbandner, 2017). Thus, the present findings
support early speculations that there might be a sensory long-
term memory system that stores information about currently
processed visual information (Johnson, 1983).
Another question concerns the possible limits of the ability to
store detailed copies of current visual stimulations in long-term
memory. On the one hand, as the objects in the present study
were visually overlapped by words to withdraw the observers’
attention from the objects, it seems likely that the observed
memory performance even underestimates what is stored from
objects when they are not partly hidden by artificial irrelevant
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stimuli. On the other hand, previous research provides some
hints that there may be both spatial and temporal limits.
Regarding spatial limits, as the unattended stimuli in the
present study were presented foveally, it may be that unattended
peripheral stimuli are not stored in long-term memory. Indeed,
preliminary evidence comes from a study by Lavie et al. (2009)
where no object memory in a two-alternative forced choice
test was observed when to-be-attended stimuli surrounded to-
be-ignored object pictures. Regarding temporal limits, previous
research has shown that the pictures in a rapid serial visual
presentation task have to be presented long enough to assure
that they can be recognized later. Although observers are able
to detect a picture on the basis of meaning possibly even at
presentation durations as brief as 13 ms (Potter et al., 2014; but
see Maguire and Howe, 2016), subsequent recognition memory
seems to be poor if the presentation rate is below 500 ms (Potter
and Levy, 1969; for a review see Potter, 2012). Thus, it may be
that unattended stimuli are not stored if presented at presentation
rates below 500 ms. However, since mainly single item old/new
recognition tests have been used in the studies on recognition
memory for rapidly presented pictures, potential temporal limits
have to be explored in future research.
To summarize, the present findings may provide a starting
point to rethink current models of memory storage as it seems
to be the case that much more information is stored in long-
term memory than previously believed. Furthermore, the present
findings may have important implications for applied settings
such as eyewitness testimony because visual memories about
past events may exhibit a much higher degree of details when
appropriately tested. Thus, the present study may open new
interesting avenues for both basic and applied future research.
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